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In positing a narrative involving the limits to regulating social media there are two 
fundamental variables that must be considered.  The first involves possibly one of 
the greatest challenges of all that the State faces to introducing additional regulation 
regarding the use of social media – this relates to the physical barriers to regulation 
such as the ability of enforcement agencies to police the millions of individual 
interactions occurring simultaneously around the globe. 
The technical constraints to regulation could, at least in terms of an economic 
analysis of law perspective,[1] be considered as a substantial factor impacting on 
questions of legitimacy in regulating social media. Indeed it could be argued that if 
the technical impediments to regulation are such to render State intervention 
ineffectual at best and demonstrably harmful at worst, then the State may, for the 
first time in history, be facing a set of very unique technological challenges to its 
authority and ability to maintain traditional models of regulatory structures.  The 
problem then becomes one similar to the so called ‘war on drugs’ where critics argue 
the authorities will never completely eradicate the problem.[2] 
 
At the risk of overstating the power that social media yields over the State, a number 
of physical impediments to regulation might include such things as jurisdictional 
dilemmas and resource allocation associated with surveillance and 
enforcement.  Technology poses significant problems for law enforcement authorities 
whereby sophisticated means of surveillance is crucial yet would appear inadequate 
given the number of users to the number of surveillance officers.  The difficulties in 
regulating social media are further compounded due to the sheer volume and 
amount of data being relayed around the globe at any one time and this would make 
the job of law enforcement authorities near on impossible to determine if and when 
users are breaching the provisions of any legislation. Therefore any discussion which 
involves additional regulation of social media must also be mindful of the 
technological constraints of regulation and compliance. 
A second problem exists for the State on a philosophical level.  Such questions arise 
because of underlying philosophical beliefs regarding individual freedoms and the 
assumed rights we have as citizens within western democracies that connotes the 
proposition that individuals be allowed to do as they please, albeit with minimal 
constraints and without State interference.[3] Such beliefs must be considered a 
crucial meta narrative as to why the imposition of regulation in the use of social 
media might be considered undesirable.  As Baginni points out, ‘to oppose [individual 
freedom] is to be opposed to the very basis of democratic society.’[4] 
Such an abhorrence towards the regulation of social media would be shared by 
those who believe that individual freedom has been and continues to be the 
cornerstone of Western political thought – a thought premised on the notion that the 
less control the State has, in this instance, regarding social media, the better it is for 
society as a whole.[5]  As Berlin asserts, the wider the area of non-interference by 
the State, the wider freedom the individual has.[6]  Certainly minimal State 
intervention regarding individual freedom is a hall mark of Western liberal 
democracies and it is only when there is clear and present harm stemming from 
particular actions should the State be allowed to intervene to protect the citizenry – 
even from themselves.[7] 
 
These two fundamental problems therefore must be addressed or at least 
considered before legitimacy can be claimed in regulating social media. 
The duality that exists between the technical and logistical constraints that 
lawmakers face with potential regulation of social media, and that which exists from 
an underlying philosophical tenet in Western democracies that, at its core, relies on 
minimal State intervention.  Due to the duality of the ‘logistical’ and ‘philosophical’ 
there are fundamental barriers to regulation. Not only is it technically difficult to 
regulate social media, to do so could violate the very philosophical foundations of 
Western democratic values. 
 
It is a similar situation with a range of other social phenomena such as gun control, 
censorship, alcohol and drug restrictions, gambling and even the wearing of seat 
belts.  The question regarding the degree of State involvement remains the same for 
each of but for whatever reason, the law has been applied differently according to 
the cultural norms and values specific to that issue by deconstructing the issue within 
its socio-political context.  The difference with social media however is due to the 
pervasiveness in which social media penetrates the lives of people in ways that 
might render it quite different to most other social phenomenon that has thus far 
been considered. 
The relevant consideration thus becomes how should social media be deconstructed 
to better understand it as a product for regulation?  Social media is constructed 
through a plurality of understanding according to its social context in which it is 
encountered.  The problem with the multiplicity of meaning through which society 
views social media, is that this throws up certain challenges regarding how social 
media is to be understood and whether it is at all possible to think of social media as 
a single coherent entity despite the singularity of nomenclature with which it is 
commonly referred to.  That is to say, is it possible to observe social media in the 
same way as we have done for gun control, pornography, hate speech and even 
seat belts?  To date, what regulators have sought to do rather than restrict social 
media through direct regulation, is to embrace the use of social media technology 
and counteract the deleterious effects of it through educational campaigns and the 
strengthening of existing legislation. This would indicate that the State views social 
media as something quite different. The result appears to be somewhat ‘passive’ and 
non-engaging.  Is this the correct approach? 
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